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Why do companies not follow through with an IPO after filing for one? This question is 
investigated by examining common stock IPOs for the largest countries in Europe. We cover 80% 
of the Western European IPO market over the 2001-2015 period. We establish that the IPO 
phenomenon of withdrawal is a common feature of equity markets and identify key characteristics 
that influence the probability of withdrawal. Findings indicate that venture capital or private equity 
involvement, the presence of negative news, CEO duality, or the intent to retire debt increase the 
probability of IPO withdrawal. On the other hand, higher levels of corporate governance or trading 
volume decrease the pssrobability of IPO withdrawal. We argue that imminent agency conflicts 
and the lack of appropriate control mechanisms can force a company to withdraw from the IPO. 
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1 Introduction 
The key moment in a company’s life cycle is to go public: to launch an Initial Public 












and organisationally. Non-financial costs such as increased oversight, or scrutiny, for instance, can 
act as a significant deterrent to the filing of IPOs (Bessler et al., 2017). In the light of this tradeoff, 
certain planned IPOs may even end up withdrawn (Helbing, 2019). The IPO process is 
undoubtedly linked to agency conflicts in which potential investors and IPO insiders might come 
to diverging IPO valuations (Lo et al., 2017; Signori, 2018) Owen-Smith et al. (2015) argue that 
the process is influenced by a combination of status signalling and resource and information 
transfer. In the light of these aspects, the issuer reserves the option to change course at any time 
and withdraw the IPO before its completion (Busaba et al., 2001). As Boeh and Dunbar (2013) 
note, an IPO withdrawal is not necessarily a negative event. If the issuer has a superior option, 
withdrawing can be a positive outcome, and, having withdrawn a company can reissue. Research, 
however, shows that an IPO withdrawal reduces the probability and issue price of a second time 
IPO; indeed Dunbar (1998), Dunbar and Foerster (2008) and Lian and Wang (2012) find that 
issuers withdrawing their IPO are unlikely to reissue. 
By studying both completed and withdrawn IPO filings we are in a better place to 
understand Initial Public Offerings. Completed IPOs tell us only part of the story (Busaba et al., 
2015) To date, all research on the extent and determinants of IPO withdrawal has been conducted 
using US data, drawing an empirical conclusion for a globalised world based on a limited sample 
and on a single institutional framework. The determinants of an IPO withdrawal remain, therefore, 
opaque, especially where Europe is concerned. How can we understand the puzzles around Initial 
Public Offerings if we are unaware of 12% of the pieces? This 12% approximates the IPO 
withdrawal rate in a sample of 2,808 IPO filings in France, Germany, Italy, Scandinavia, Spain, 
and the United Kingdom between 2001 and 2015. This withdrawal rate is in stark contrast to the 
US, where the rate is more than twice as high at 30%; this difference is possibly explained by the 
fact that in Europe only a few, larger, capital markets attract IPOs. From 2001 to 2015 an 
aggregated amount of USD 563 bn and USD 529 bn was raised in initial public offerings in 
Western Europe and the USA, respectively. This demonstrates that Europe was the bigger IPO 
market in this time period, and that investment opportunities of an accumulated USD 151 bn 
(Europe) and USD 152 bn (USA) were foregone as a consequence of IPO withdrawal. 
Our paper contributes to and complements the existing literature on IPOs and IPO 
withdrawal and, therefore, aims to advance research in these areas. First, we test various concepts 












extent of IPO withdrawal vs listing for the main European countries within a new database unique 
in its extent and depth. Third, we extend the existing US based literature to a more heterogeneous 
setting, both geographically and qualitatively, by including a variety of hand collected variables 
not previously considered in the determination of the withdrawal decision. 
Most companies that withdraw blame unfavourable market conditions, however, we 
identify IPO offer and corporate governance characteristics to be the main drivers of IPO 
withdrawal. In general, we argue that IPO withdrawal is a common feature of the main markets in 
Europe, just as it is in the US, while the determinants of withdrawal depend on the institutional and 
market setting. We argue that a further planned alignment in EU legislation will harmonise 
differences in the determinants of IPO withdrawal. 
We find that, in Europe, Venture Capital (VC) and Private Equity (PE) involvement 
significantly increases the likelihood of withdrawal which is in stark contrast to previous findings 
for the USA (Busaba et al., 2001, Dunbar and Foerster, 2008). Furthermore, we find that the intent 
to retire debt with the IPO proceeds significantly increases the probability of withdrawal. Issuers 
that face negative news or have CEO duality prior to their IPO are more likely to withdraw. When 
insiders agree on longer lock-up periods as well as a higher level of board independence or 
disclose intellectual capital, issuers are more likely to follow through with the IPO. Better 
corporate governance characteristics decrease the probability of an IPO withdrawal, while the lack 
of appropriate control mechanisms increases the chance of withdrawal. The presence of a 
greenshoe option introduces price stability after listing and decreases the probability of IPO 
withdrawal. These symptoms are consistent with the theories of Jensen (1986) and Baker and 
Gompers (2003). 
From a life cycle perspective, a larger firm size decreases the probability of withdrawal, 
whereas a larger offer size increases the probability. In terms of market timing characteristics we 
find that a higher level of Rule of Law decreases the probability of IPO withdrawal. Only in the 
UK do we find evidence indicative of a window of market timing opportunity based on the 
decreased trading volume for withdrawn IPOs. We argue, therefore, that imminent agency 
conflicts and the lack of appropriate control mechanisms can force a company to withdraw from 
the IPO. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the factors 












approach as well as the dataset. Empirical evidence for the determinants of IPO withdrawal from 
analysing market and firm level data are presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes this 
paper with a brief summary and a discussion of the implications of this research. 
 
2. The IPO withdrawal 
Three closely intertwined theoretical threads exist when examining the determinants of IPO 
withdrawal: agency based, life cycle and market timing theories. The agency theory assumes 
inherent conflicts for IPO companies between the management, who control the firm’s resources, 
and the potential shareholders, who own the firm’s resources (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The 
implied adverse selection and moral hazard issues in an Initial Public Offering can stop the process 
and must, therefore, be addressed and mitigated (La Porta et al., 2006). Latham and Braun (2010) 
suggest that managerial, firm, and environmental risk factors need to be examined in order to 
understand the decision behind IPO withdrawal. It can be assumed that the ultimate responsibility 
for the decision to withdraw from the IPO is that of the CEO despite the involvement of multiple 
other parties along the way to going public. Agency conflicts might arise between any financial 
intermediaries, the company, and the potential investors (Baker and Gompers, 2003) and these 
must be mitigated for if an IPO is to be successful. 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) hypothesise that when a firm grows sufficiently large, it 
implies an IPO as the conclusive step in a company’s life cycle since a more dispersed ownership 
is required; while the IPO marks the most important public information event, opening a two-way 
information channel. Zingales (1995) argues that by going public, insiders facilitate the acquisition 
of their company. In Europe, we find an interesting institutional setting with a combination of main 
markets and the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in the UK. This second market provides 
small and young companies with a platform for raising funds to finance growth and advance in the 
life cycle (Vismara et al., 2012). 
Under market timing theory, and assuming asymmetric information, the valuation of an 
IPO company is influenced by a variety of firm and non-firm specific characteristics (Allen and 
Faulhaber, 1989). Using the framework of Benveniste et al. (2002) on information revelation 
theory, we argue that signalling generally decreases a priori uncertainty about the success of an 












for the shares of the firm going public, negative ones decrease the same (Brau and Fawcett, 2006). 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) argue that companies that face higher uncertainty are 
intrinsically more difficult to value and therefore have higher evaluation costs. Not all companies 
trying to go public are successful, as the equilibrium offer price is noisy. Potential investors value 
the IPO company on a subjective probability of the expectation of future success and this 
evaluation is derived from a network of strong, weak, positive, and negative signals represented by 
firm and non-firm characteristics (Owen-Smith et al., 2015) Information transfers through 
signalling possess a key efficiency property since signalling incurs potential welfare costs. A 
reliable and credible signal must be too costly to be imitated by ‘bad companies’ (Leland and Pyle, 
1977). According to Rock (1986) information can be revealed directly through the IPO prospectus 
or indirectly through price. In consequence, the IPO company can (falsely) signal the unobservable 
quality to the potential investor via observable proxies in the IPO prospectus or during the 
bookbuilding process for instance (Connelly et al., 2010)1. The IPO company and the underwriter 
trade-off the benefits and costs of information revelation (Sherman and Titman, 2002), but the IPO 
company could remain private if the potential investors incur significant information acquisition 
costs (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989). Edelen and Kadlee (2005) argue that underpricing an IPO 
decreases the probability of IPO withdrawal, as the issuer must trade-off the proceeds from the 
underpriced IPO against the probability of IPO withdrawal. This implies that IPOs are withdrawn 
when the equilibrium offer price is below a certain issuer’s fundamental value threshold 




As outlined in Figure 1, firms withdraw for a variety of reasons (Boeh and Dunbar, 2013). 
Over the last decade it has become more common for companies to operate a ‘du l tr ck’ approach 
(see Field and Karpoff (2002) and Ewens and Farre-Mensa (2017), or more recently Greene (2016) 
and Aktas et al. (2018)) whereby, concurrent with the IPO filing, trade sale or private placement 
opportunities are sought (Boeh and Dunbar, 2016). In most cases the existence of a dual track 
approach is only observable ex post, typically defined as an instance whereby a withdrawn IPO is 
                                                 
1 Work on the IPO bookbuilding process in terms of information revelation casts doubt on the actual information 












sold in a trade sale within one year of the withdrawal. The post-withdrawal experience of IPO 
candidates has received limited attention; much of the research has been in the area of 
entrepreneurial finance; see Field and Karpoff (2002) and Brau et al. (2010). More recent work has 
begun to evaluate the afterlife of withdrawn firms, surfacing the determinants of different 
post-withdrawal outcomes (Boeh and Dunbar, 2013). Of course, prior to the evaluation of a 
taxonomy of post-withdrawal events, it is necessary to lay the groundwork with regards to the 
number, and determinants, of IPO withdrawal, and this is what our paper aims to do. To the best of 
our knowledge there is no documentation on European IPO withdrawal; we simply do not know 
what determines IPO withdrawal in Europe and can only infer from previous research which is, as 
discussed above, based in a different institutional and regulatory setting. 
 
2.1. The European IPO setting 
In Europe, and greatly in contrast to the USA, the ‘event’ of an IPO withdrawal is neither formally 
defined nor mentioned in European Union (EU) or country specific directives. This means that the 
event of an IPO withdrawal cannot be identified as to the exact date, therefore any event window is 
very blurry. Given the reporting environment, we can only infer the event after the IPO filing date. 
Compared to the US, there are established differences in regulatory and financial market 
particularities in Europe (see online appendix for European regulatory development), although the 
issuance process is comparable between the US and Europe. Generally IPO companies in Europe 
are more diverse and older than in the US (Ritter, 2003, Ritter et al., 2013). There are only 
marginal numbers of foreign listings in European markets; the IPO market in Europe can be 
defined as a series of domestic markets with low competition between the different exchanges 
(Vismara et al., 2012). When examining the decision to go public, Bancel and Mittoo (2009) find 
that European CFOs, in contrast to American CFOs, value outsider monitoring and the enhanced 
visibility as well as financial flexibility when deciding to go public. In terms of costs that come 
with an IPO, Bancel and Mittoo (2009) argue that American CFOs seem more concerned about 
both the direct and indirect costs than their European counterparts. 
It is important to note that, historically, the different European financial markets were 
driven by national desires. This resulted in a fragmented and inflexible financial regulatory 
environment with a variety of regulatory structures and legal systems. In an effort to create a 












were introduced through EU Directives. In 1999 the European Union initiated the Financial 
Services Action Plan (FSAP) in an attempt to create a single financial services market (Cumming 
et al., 2011). In particular, EU Directives such as 2001/34/EC or 2004/109/EC as well as the 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 2004 have shifted the focus of regulations to an 
alignment of investor protection and compatibility of stock exchanges to international market 
standards (Cattaneo et al., 2015). In line with La Porta et al. (2006), it is argued that the overall 




As listed in Table 1, the number of required regulatory documents for the Official List is 
highest in the UK, and the possibility of exceptions is most pronounced in France and Italy2. The 
EU Directives are intended to establish obligatory minimum requirements in the European 
Economic Area in terms of listing standards, including prospectus information, controlling bodies, 
and transferability. Admittedly, due to the nature of the EEA, these directives are positioned in a 
rather generalist way ensuring a maximum of flexibility to the individual countries. The general 
IPO regulation is respectively homogeneous, while the details on listing standards differ 
marginally; for instance corporate governance, timing, fees and liability are country-specific. 
A more detailed analysis is provided in the online appendix. Our paper aims to provide 
further empiricial evidence, in the form of statistical analysis of IPO withdrawal, on the evolution 
of the integrative financial markets in Europe, with a focus on the harmonisation of regulatory 
standards, as well as country-specific financial customs. We hypothesis that further alignments in 
EU legislation would harmonise differences in the determinants of IPO withdrawal. In the last few 
years, the major European countries have aligned their listing requirements and standards and, as 
shown in Table 1, exhibit only low variability. We document that the phenomenon of IPO 
withdrawal is a common feature of the largest equity markets in Western Europe which exhibit 
similar determinants. 
European equity markets, except for the UK, are more illiquid in nature than that of the US. 
                                                 
2 See a discussion on listing standards, market liquidity and IPO quality in Johan (2010) or Takahashi and Yamada 
(2015). Vismara et al. (2012) note that the majority of IPOs in Europe are domestic apar from the AIM in the UK 












The Continental European IPO markets can be considered especially volatile, and, in some parts, 
inopportune as evidenced in the numbers of IPOs (see Table 2). 
 
 
European IPO activity has been declining, albeit not as drastically as in the USA due to the 
popularity of the second markets such as the AIM which provide the opportunity to undertake an 
IPO for growth and for smaller firms (Ritter et al., 2013)3. These second markets represent a 
demand-side segmentation and are organised as exchange-regulated markets where the company’s 
Nominated Advisor must ensure compliance (Vismara et al., 2012). This implies that, formally, 
these second markets are not officially regulated through the European Financial Services 
Directives (Espenlaub et al., 2012). 
 
2.2. Factors influencing IPO withdrawal 
An emerging, but US centred, literature tests the determinants on the decision to withdraw, starting 
with Busaba et al. (2001). This is extended by Dunbar and Foerster (2008) who broaden the set of 
possible market and firm level explanatory variables. From these, and other papers examining IPO 
listings, we derive and identify a number of factors which may be relevant in the IPO withdrawal 
issue. The measures used to proxy these features are outlined in Table 3, and discussed in more 
detail in the online appendix. 
 
 
We can break the characteristics hypothesised to impact IPO withdrawal into a number of 
sets representing market, offer, and firm characteristics. Market characteristics can then be 
further broken down into three subcategories. The predominant theoretical concept represented is 
based on market timing theories. 
First, we consider the level of regulatory environment approximated by the country 
specific and time variant measures of the Rule of Law, Regulatory Efficiency, and the Market 
Openness Index provided by the Heritage Foundation as well as a Common Law Jurisdiction 
dummy variable which captures the differing international regulatory environments. It is argued 
                                                 












that the market-friendly and standardised disclosure, as well as liability standards, are the main 
benefits of common law for equity markets (La Porta et al., 2006). La Porta et al. (1997) suggest 
that a higher level of political stability, as well as a better legal framework, can be considered a 
favourable environment for investors. As the regulatory environment influences the uncertainty 
prior to an IPO (Engelen and van Essen, 2010), we expect that a better environment decreases the 
probability of withdrawal as it possibly reduces imminent agency conflicts in the IPO process (La 
Porta et al., 2006). 
Second, we use the change in the country’s quarterly Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
the monthly yield of ten-year government bonds, and the credit spread to represent economic 
conditions (Bergbrant et al., 2017). We expect a favourable economic environment and credit 
conditions to decrease the probability of IPO withdrawal. 
Third, we examine equity market conditions since a multiplicity of research on market 
timing suggests that companies go public given favourable market conditions, therefore exploiting 
investor sentiment (Lowry, 2003). The change in the main stock market index ( Index) signals 
positive information spillovers for potential issues. Since IPOs tend to come in waves (Nguyen 
Thanh, 2019), we examine a hotness dummy, as well as a trading volume dummy (Chemmanur 
and He, 2011). Recent research on market sentiment theorises that negative public news affects 
stock returns (Shi et al., 2016)4. Finally, we rely upon the end of the month market estimate of 
volatility (VIX) to further approximate investor sentiment (Busaba et al., 2015). 
Firm characteristics can be categorised into three areas. First, the offer characteristics 
include the offer size and the intent to retire debt with the IPO proceeds. From an agency based 
perspective, leverage reduces managerial opportunism (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) while an 
overreliance on debt can manoeuvre the company into a competitive disadvantage (Wright et al., 
2000). We anticipate that a proposal to use IPO proceeds for debt retirement is a negative signal as 
it lowers expectations about the future success of the IPO company and therefore increases the risk 
for the investor (Busaba et al., 2001). 
IPO research differentiates on the offer share structure, and findings on the effect of 
primary and secondary shares are also not unanimous (Brennan and Franks, 1997). Klein and Li 
(2009) postulate that secondary shares send a negative signal as insiders cash out. In addition, we 
also include the greenshoe option in the offer structure. Greenshoe options are considered a 
                                                 












stabilisation mechanism for the underwriter who can in turn react with enhanced flexibility on 
price volatility (Benveniste and Busaba, 1997). Krigman et al. (2001) identify underwriter 
reputation as vital to the success of issues, this is supported by the findings of Dunbar and Foerster 
(2008) and Boeh and Southam (2011). 
Another characteristic included is venture capital involvement as the VC sponsor 
potentially adds value to its portfolio firms through operational gearing (Cumming et al., 2016).
Given the fragmented risk capital market in Europe, we additionally include Private Equity 
involvement since previous research has not differentiated this. Research findings are not 
unanimous; under the agency theory a conflict arises as the exit of dominant shareholders may not 
be in the best interest for the company (Baker and Gompers, 2003). Busaba et al. (2001) and Boeh 
and Southam (2011) identify VC backing as a certification of the IPO company as it reduces the 
probability of IPO withdrawal. Similarly, Dunbar and Foerster (2008) identify venture capitalist 
certification as key for a successful return to a successful second time IPO. The European PE and 
VC market is not as developed and institutionalised as in the US market (Bessler and Thies, 2006). 
Given the different institutional setting in Europe, agency conflicts are imminent between these 
financial intermediaries and possible investors. Tykvova and Walz (2007) posit that PE and VC 
companies have an information advantage over investors which they will exploit. We expect that 
PE and VC investors pursue the most beneficial of the multiple exit routes. 
Finally, as Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) hypothesise, the cost of information 
production is essential in the IPO process. We expect that higher disclosure of the company’s 
intangible assets or competitive advantage reduces the information asymmetry between the issuer 
and the potential investor and, in consequence, reduces the probability of IPO withdrawal 5. In our 
analysis this is denoted as intellectual capital disclosure in the IPO prospectus (IC dummy) (Singh 
and van der Zahn, 2007). 
Firm characteristics include the firm size and age as we expect that larger and older issuers 
reduce the uncertainty about the long-term success of the IPO issue through positive signalling 
(Brau and Fawcet, 2006, Engelen and van Essen, 2010). We also include variables for a higher 
level of capital expenditure and net income (Lowry, 2003). Barry and Mihov (2015) state that 
financial intermediaries’ involvement, such as bank debt-financing, provides information to the 
                                                 
5 Patent quality and extant is discussed comprehensively in Bessler and Bittelmeyer (2008), who show positive 












investor and consequently reduces the uncertainty about the firm value prior to the IPO. Given 
agency related concerns when contrasting managerial and organisational risk, an overreliance of 
debt can lead to a competitive disadvantage (Wright et al., 2000). We consequently propose a 
negative signal of debt to investors as companies with too high a degree of leverage might also 
face costs of financial distress which increases the risk to investors. In addition, we suggest that the 
level of uncertainty prior to the IPO for high-tech companies will typically be more pronounced 
due to greater uncertainty in IPO issue valuation (Engelen and van Essen, 2010). Lastly, we expect 
more multinational companies to be perceived as less risky by investors due to the inherent 
operational hedge conferred by multinationality. 
The decision to undertake an Initial Public Offering boosts potential agency problems as 
the ownership becomes dispersed (Latham and Braun, 2010). Consequently, we include corporate 
governance characteristics in our analysis as investors are likely to demand signals that reduce 
possible agency issues. To proxy these the level of retained ownership by insiders after the IPO, 
the lock-up period, the board size and independence, as well as the proportion of female board 
members are presumed to decrease the probability of IPO withdrawal (Howton et al., 2001, Djerbi 
and Anis, 2015, Brav and Gompers, 2003, Gao et al., 2017, Wu and Hsu, 2018). CEO duality, a 
role combination of the chairman and CEO, is expected to increase the likelihood of IPO 
withdrawal (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008). Based on agency conflicts, CEO duality may cause 
additional monitoring costs and limit the board’s oversight ability (McGuinness, 2016, Bertoni et 
al., 2014). In Europe, we have an interesting setting with regards to corporate governance; EU 
Directives are fostering harmonisation of national corporate governance codes, hence on the EEA 
level there is a remarkable degree of agreement (Akyol et al., 2014). Bertoni et al. (2014) suppose 
a differentiation of the board structure across the life cycle. With a resource-dependency for 
younger companies, corporate governance acts as value creation mechanisms, whereas the agency 
conflicts are more prominent with mature companies where corporate governance protects value. 
The average age of a company that files for an IPO in Europe is 16 years (22 years excluding the 
AIM), hence we expect the lack of adequate corporate governance mechanisms to result in a 
shortage of oversight and value protection. This idea is consistent with Bancel and Mittoo (2009) 
who document that outside monitoring is considered a major benefit of the equity market by 














3. Methods and Data 
In light of the data and following academic convention, we employ a probit model to identify the 
determinants of IPO withdrawal (Busaba et al., 2011). We apply a binary model, where the 
dependent variable y  is the event of an IPO withdrawal and takes the value 1 if the IPO is 
withdrawn and 0 otherwise, so that our basic model is defined as: 
 ( 0 | ) = ( )j j jPr y x x   (1) 
where jx  are the independent variables listed in Table 1 with their according   coefficient, and 
  the cumulative normal distribution. 
In order to interpret results, we consider the marginal effects (ME) of changes in x  on the 
dependent variable y , expressed by a linear function  : 
 
( 1| )




   

 (2) 
Equation 2 is slightly modified in the presence of dichotomous dummies and specified as: 
 = ( | =1) ( | = 0)k kME x x x x      (3) 
therefore focusing on differences in the assumption that all dummies equal either 0 or 1 under a 
given specification. 
This paper examines all IPO filings in the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and 
Scandinavia from January 2001 to December 20156. Following usual practice in IPO literature 
(Ritter, 1987), we examine all common stock IPOs and therefore exclude Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (REITs), American Depositary Receipts (ADRs), closed-end or mutual funds, special 
purpose entities and rights issuance. Unlike other studies, financial companies remain in the 
sample7. We retrieve the list of IPO filings from Bloomberg and validate the accuracy with the 
information provided by the respective stock exchange. The IPO prospectuses are downloaded 
from Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters, stock exchange or company websites, or from other public 
sources. Our dataset covers 82% of the Western European IPO market (see Figure 2) and consists 
                                                 
6 Throughout the modelling process we tested for endogeneity in our estimates. In no case was endogeneity an 
issue, results are available on request. 
7 As a robustness check we exclude financial and state-owned enterprises from the sample. Our findings remain 












of a total of 2,808 companies that filed for an IPO, of which 2,474 were successful and listed 
whereas 334 (11.89%) withdrew. 
 
 
We use public sources such as Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters for economic and market 
specific characteristics but hand collect the majority of variables for the offer, firm, and corporate 
governance variables from the individual IPO prospectuses given the lack of available information 
in Europe. This makes our dataset unique in its extent, detail and depth. 
The majority of IPO filings, in both number and volume, are from the UK which is as 
expected, given the Alternative Investment Market, with 1,454 successful and 147 withdrawn 
IPOs overall (about 50% of the sample), followed by France and then Germany. We start in 2001 
for two reasons. First, this provides us with a sample period post the dot.com bubble, yet covering 
at least two full economic cycles in Europe. Second, given the significant changes in regulation, 
European integration, and corporate governance, we felt that moving back into the 1990s and 
beyond would result in a dataset of considerably greater than needed heterogeneity. As outlined, 
the EU Directive 2001/34/EC became effective as of early 2001, explicitly requiring minimum 
IPO listing requirements and regulatory standards for all countries in the European Economic Area 
for the first time. 
There is considerable variation in the level of European IPOs and IPO withdrawal as 
depicted in Table 2. The wave like nature of IPOs over time is evident here. The number of 
companies that file for an initial public offering was highest between 2004 and 2007 with a peak of 
366 IPO filings in 2005. In contrast, after the latest global financial crisis erupted, there were as 
few as 18 filings in all countries combined in 2009. The lowest IPO withdrawal rate is about 3.5% 
in 2003 with a peak of 22% in 2011. Significant variation is also evident across countries. In 
Figure 3 we show the country-specific extent of withdrawal and variation over the database. As a 
preliminary investigation Table 4 reports the means and standard deviations of the variables 
according to IPO status. We also provide a test for differences in means across status. 
 
 
The majority of companies withdrawing typically blame unfavourable market conditions, 












associated with higher levels of regulatory environment metrics such as Rule of Law, Regulatory 
Efficiency or Common Law Jurisdiction which is consistent with expectation (La Porta et al., 
1998). In line with Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999), successful IPO listings are more frequent 
during ‘hot’ markets, where the market estimate for future volatility (VIX) and the credit market 
conditions are low. Market conditions, approximated by the change of the lead stock market index, 
GDP, or trading volume, are marginally positive for successful IPOs which support the idea of 
market timing (Benninga et al., 2005). In addition, market sentiment seems to have an effect: it is 
significantly more frequent that companies withdraw their IPO, than that it is successful, following 
negative news coverage giving rise to agency related issues. 
The offer size of withdrawn IPOs is significantly larger which enforces the claim that 
potential investors and IPO insiders have diverging views on the offer price and size (Benveniste 
and Spindt, 1989). While there seems to be no variation on the offer share structure for withdrawn 
IPOs, greenshoe options seem to be more frequent with filed IPOs. As anticipated, withdrawn 
companies display significantly higher mean levels of debt and are also more likely to use the IPO 
proceeds to retire outstanding debt. We find a surprising result when we examine the role of 
private equity and venture capital: withdrawals are more likely to have had PE or VC involvement 
than successful IPOs. 
Besides this, consistent with Boeh and Southam (2011), withdrawn IPOs tend to have 
poorer corporate governance which is represented in a shorter lock-up period. This is in 
accordance with Brav and Gompers (2003) who establish longer lock-up periods as a positive 
signal. Also, withdrawn IPOs have fewer independent board members. The lack of board 
independence is interpreted as an absence of a critical disciplining body of management; imminent 
agency conflicts might be perceived as risky by investors (Djerbi and Anis, 2015). We also find 
that corporate governance measures fail to act as a value protection mechanism (Bertoni et al., 
2014)8. Finally, withdrawn issuers disclose their intellectual capital and competitive advantage 
less often, which is consistent with previous findings (Singh and van der Zahn, 2007). 
 
4. The Determinants of IPO Withdrawal 
4.1. General findings 
                                                 












Table 5 provides results of the probit analysis. We report the probit coefficient estimates, the 
corresponding p-values and marginal effects9. The results of the probit regression are largely 
consistent with the findings from the descriptive statistics. At a 5% significance level we find that 
21 variables show explanatory power on the probability to withdraw an IPO. 
 
 
For ease of interpretation, Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the principal and secondary drivers of 
the IPO withdrawal which are significant at the 5% significance level. 
 
 
Four offer characteristics come up as positive and significant. We find that the larger the 
offer size, the higher the probability of withdrawal. As mentioned above, one possibility is that 
larger issues are more likely to be withdrawn when they face scepticism at the aggregated demand 
from potential investors (Benveniste et al., 2002). We assume that this finding is driven by the 
determinants of IPO withdrawal in the UK and France as shown in Table 6. The presence of a 
greenshoe option introduces price stability after the IPO listing and decreases the probability of 
IPO withdrawal (Benveniste and Busaba, 1997). Disclosing intellectual capital in the prospectus 
decreases the probability of IPO withdrawal by almost 6% (van der Zahn et al., 2007). This 
reduces the information asymmetry between the potential investor and the insiders and, 
consequently, anticipated agency conflicts. 
 
 
The intent to retire debt with the proceeds of the IPO imposes potential agency conflicts on 
the investor (Wright et al., 2000). This is confirmed by the probit findings suggesting that debt 
retirement increases the probability to withdraw by as much as 3% according to the marginal 
effects in Table 5. Dunbar and Foerster (2008) hypothesise that debt signals the availability of 
alternative sources of finance, leading to a higher propensity of IPO withdrawal. In the European 
context, one can more likely conclude that debt and debt retirement serve as negative signals on the 
future success of the company. As Pagano et al. (1998) evidence, most companies intend to 
                                                 
9 The regressions appear reasonably well specified as shown in Table 5. The HL goodness of fit test and the 












rebalance their accounts with the IPO in Europe. Especially when considering the role of debt in 
Italy or Germany, banks exert substantial control over the firms such as holding voting rights and 
being represented on the supervisory board (Chirinko and Elston, 2006). Despite the potential 
benefits of bank concentrated ownership, control dilemmas are present in this construct (Elston 
and Rondi, 2006). 
We find that VC and PE significantly and economically increase the probability of IPO 
withdrawal by almost 7% and 4% respectively. We propose two marginally competing 
explanations. First, VC and PE partners exploit market timing. Tykova and Walz (2007) and Chen 
and Liang (2016) argue that venture capitalists and private equity firms have an information 
advantage over investors; and, as a consequence, they are more likely to withdraw from the IPO 
for the benefit of a more favourable option (Cumming, 2008). But, it is interesting to examine what 
happened to the VC or PE backed company in our sample, after the IPO withdrawal. We evaluate 
the aftermath of the PE and VC backed IPO withdrawal companies and find that about 63% of 
private equity backed, and 57% of venture capital backed, companies engaged in a presumably 
superior alternative. This means that the target companies went public or were sold in a trade sale 
or secondary buyout10. Our empirical evidence suggests that PE and VC partners pursue a dual 
track approach and try to exploit market timing. In fact, Gill and Walz (2016) argue that an IPO 
with venture capital backing can be interpreted as a delayed trade sale. The empirical evidence is 
more pronounced for private equity backed IPO companies than for venture capital ones. Still, in 
half of the cases, there was no superior alternative, leaving some questions about the role of PE and 
VC in Europe. Second, on the contrary, we query the positive intrinsic value role of VC and PE 
involvement for Europe, considering the ineffective certification of VC in France, for example, 
(Chahine and Filatotchev, 2008) combined with the fragmented European market for risk capital 
(Goergen et al., 2009, Groh et al., 2010). We challenge possible imminent agency conflicts of VC 
and PE involvement for Europe. Compared to the US, in general, the European market for venture 
capital and private equity is still seen as lagging behind (see, for example, Bessler and Thies 
(2006) and more recently Bertoni et al. (2015))11. Particularly in France and Germany, the exit of 
VC or PE investors might not be in the best interest of the IPO company, as it imposes agency 
                                                 
10 A supplemental analysis can be found in the online appendix. 
11 For a trade perspective on the persistent differences and relative lagging of the European markets see Levin 












conflicts between minority and dominant owners (Baker and Gompers, 2003). This can be 
ascribed to the relatively lower level and complexity of PE and VC performance, reputation, and 
consistency in Europe as argued by Tykvova and Walz (2007). Proksch et al. (2017) undertake a 
qualitative analysis of German venture capital companies’ bu iness documentation, showing that 
venture capital activity is rather heterogeneous in terms of value added activity within backed 
firms. While France and Italy score below average on the VC/PE attractiveness index, Germany 
scores average due to the bank-led capital market (Groh et al., 2010). Klein et al. (2016) attribute 
the banking system in Germany as the cornerstone of its capital market. PE and VC might not be 
independent from banks and thus be perceived as a riskier form of credit financing only. VC 
investment varies significantly in quality and, as such, a lack of control negatively affects the 
performance of investments and, therefore, the certification (Cumming, 2008)12. 
Consistent with previous findings, and in accordance with the life cycle framework, the 
larger the firm size, the lower the probability of IPO withdrawal (Busaba et al., 2001, Boeh and 
Southam, 2011), as information production costs are decreased (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1999). 
While a higher level of debt statistically increases the probability of IPO withdrawal, the economic 
impact is marginal, however this reinforces our suggestion about the role of debt in Europe. There 
are several market characteristics that are statistically significant, but have no economic impact 
(see Table 5). Only two market characteristics have an economic impact on the probability of IPO 
withdrawal. First, an increased trading volume around the filing of the IPO decreases the 
likelihood of IPO withdrawal by about 4%. This result is mainly driven by the UK as this is the 
only European country where the trading volume turns out to significantly influence IPO 
withdrawal. We conclude that there does exist some form of opportunity window in the UK, given 
its liquid stock markets. We do not find evidence for this in other European countries, arguably 
because of the illiquid nature of stock markets. Second, as suggested by the statistical results, the 
presence of negative news prior to an IPO increases the probability to withdraw by as much as 
14%, which is a remarkably large effect. This result is not surprising considering the importance of 
market sentiment and the effect of negative signals (Shi et al., 2016). Negative news stories are 
easily accessible through the public press. Potential investors can incorporate this information into 
                                                 
12 As proposed by Nahata (2008), time-variant venture capital quality and consistency seems to be a piece of the 
risk capital puzzle. Given the sample size of VC-backed IPOs in Europe from 2001 to 2015, a qualitative approach 












their expectation about the IPO company’s future success, which might reveal further agency 
conflicts. This expectation is most likely lowered when a company is mentioned negatively in the 
news, as this potentially decreases reputation, sales, or in the worst case, reveals fraudulent 
behaviour. 
The corporate governance metrics of lock-up period, board independence, and CEO 
duality prove to be of significant explanatory power in accordance with the descriptive statistics. 
This supports the finding of Boeh and Southam (2011) that good corporate governance is a 
positive signal to investors and reduces the IPO company’s uncertainty and, likewise, the 
probability to withdraw. L:atham and Braun (2010) suggest that this is because appropriate control 
mechanisms being in place mitigates agency conflicts and reduces agency costs. The CEO duality 
dummy reduces the probability of IPO withdrawal by almost 5% which is contrary to expectation 
(Bhagat and Bolton, 2008). In Table 6 it becomes evident that the results seem to be driven by 
France. We offer two competing explanations to contextualise the negative correlation between 
CEO duality and likelihood of IPO withdrawal. Our findings might support the stewardship theory 
which we deem unlikely. Instead, we identify a more compelling answer within behavioural 
finance. We suggest that the CEO is pushing through the IPO despite potential higher costs 
associated with underpricing as the diligence and control mechanisms do not function properly 
when the role of CEO and chairman is combined (Bertoni et al., 2014). Boulton and Campbell 
(2016) find evidence that managerial overconfidence is associated with higher underpricing. 
We then break the sample into country-specific elements. We can establish a pronounced 
alignment of the country-specific determinants of IPO withdrawal. Given the harmonised 
European regulatory environment this is as expected. Considering the country-specific results of 
the probit analysis for the UK, France, Germany, Italy, and Scandinavia in Table 6 it becomes 
clear that corporate governance metrics reduce the probability of withdrawal. Lock-up periods are 
important in most of Europe, except Germany where retained ownership appears to matter more, 
and all countries, except France, value board independence. As outlined, the disclosure of 
intellectual capital or competitive advantages mitigates information asymmetries (Singh and van 
der Zahn, 2007). In particular, this result provides reasonable evidence for the benefits of 
information revelation. Companies that withdraw their IPOs disclose their intellectual capital or 
competitive advantage less frequently, imposing a higher evaluation cost on the potential 












In summary, the following characteristics are of statistical and economical power: while 
the presence of negative news, venture capital or private equity backing, and debt retirement 
increases the probability of IPO withdrawal, the disclosure of intellectual capital, a higher trading 
volume and better corporate governance decreases same. As becomes evident, the 
country-specific determinants of IPO withdrawal overwhelmingly align with the consolidated 
results for the European determinants of IPO withdrawal. 
As a robustness check13, we run probit regressions using dummy variables (for further 
explanation/information refer to the online appendix), as opposed to logarithmic values, for firm 
size, offer size and firm age for the whole sample as well as the country specific sub-samples. The 
majority of variables are significant in both specifications for the European dataset, as well as for 
the country specific ones. This is consistent with regulatory efforts on the European capital 
markets integration, further information is available in the online appendix. We also run a probit 
regression excluding the UK and separating the AIM IPO filings as those IPOs constitute about 
52% and 40% respectively of our sample data. The results in Table 5 indicate that the probit 
regression remains broadly unchanged. This also applies for the results we find when separating 
the AIM IPO filling in the UK specific regression. Further robustness checks can be reviewed in 
the online appendix. 
 
4.2. Comparison with existing findings 
As established earlier in the paper, we already know that there exist differences between the 
European and American IPO markets (Ritter, 2003, Ritter et al., 2013). Interestingly, we can 
identify different empirical manifestations when examining the phenomenon of IPO withdrawal. 
While most results for the largest European equity markets show similarities to US-based research, 
some of our findings are in contrast to Busaba et al. (2001) and Dunbar and Foerster (2008) and 
Boeh and Southam (2011). This does not consequently lead to an overthrow of the findings for the 
US equity market, but it leads to the conclusion that, while a feature in European and US equity 
markets, the phenomenon of IPO withdrawal needs to be examined within an institutional setting. 
Dunbar and Foerster (2008), as well as Boeh and Southam (2011), find that successful IPO 
                                                 
13 Given the large number of variables, we compute a correlation matrix which shows t at multicollinearity is not 












companies have a significantly larger offer size when descriptively analysing the differences 
between successful and withdrawn IPOs. While it is argued that a smaller size is riskier (Busaba et 
al., 2001, Dunbar and Foerster, 2008), our results contradict these US-specific findings; withdrawn 
IPOs are of a significantly larger filing size. Busaba et al. (2001) find a positive relation between 
filing size and the probability of withdrawal. 
The finding that is in starkest contrast to studies of the US market is the role that venture 
capitalist and private equity involvement plays. Busaba et al. (2001) find that VC involvement 
significantly reduces the probability of IPO withdrawal, in line with the certification hypothesis. 
Dunbar and Foerster (2008) identify venture capitalist involvement as key for a successful return 
to the equity market after IPO withdrawal. As discussed above, compared to the US, the European 
market for venture capital and private equity is still seen as lagging behind (Bessler and Thies, 
2006). For half of the companies in our dataset that withdraw their IPO, we find that PE and VC 
investors are more likely to withdraw from the IPO for the benefit of a more favourable option 
(Cumming, 2008). We uncover further evidence to cast doubt on the causal mechanisms of 
certification proposed for the US consistent with Chahine and Filatotchev (2008)’s findings for 
France alone. Our empirical evidence suggests that PE and VC partners pursue a dual track 
approach and try to exploit market timing, giving rise to potential agency problems between the 
dominant and potential minority shareholder. 
The variables that do not appear as significant are also of interest in comparison to previous 
US-centric studies. Carter and Manaster (1990) and Krigman et al. (2001) established the positive 
signalling effect of the underwriters’ reputation for the US. Unlike in the study of IPO withdrawal 
for the US market by Dunbar and Foerster (2008) the underwriters’ eputation and market share do 
not appear to matter in the European market. Klein et al. (2016) argue that companies chose their 
underwriter not on reputation but by previous linkages. Therefore, the certification role of 
underwriters that is observed in the US does not apply to Germany, Italy, Scandinavia or the UK 
due to the specific universal operations of banks. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We analyse a dataset of all IPO filings from 2001 through 2015 in France, Germany, Italy, 












results. Given the different regulatory and institutional setting, we postulate that Europe is 
different from the US when it comes to the level and determinants of IPO withdrawal. We do not 
find compelling evidence in favour of the market timing theory to explain IPO withdrawal. The 
level of trading volume and the presence of a greenshoe option decrease the probability of IPO 
withdrawal. The effect, however, is limited to the UK, the most liquid equity market in Europe. In 
line with life cycle ideas, a larger firm size reduces the probability that a company withdraws from 
the IPO. We find that market sentiment does matter since negative news about an issuer increases 
the probability of IPO withdrawal. Likewise, good corporate governance and the disclosure of 
intellectual capital reduce the probability of IPO withdrawal. We argue with managerial 
overconfidence in explaining why CEO duality decreases the likelihood of IPO withdrawal. We 
find that debt retirement, venture capital and private equity involvement significantly increase the 
probability of withdrawal which is driven by the German and French markets. We explain this 
phenomenon with the less advanced role of these in Europe compared to the US and with the dual 
track approach of VC and PE companies. 
Drawing from the empirical evidence we can suggest the following theoretical 
implications of determinants of IPO withdrawal. First, we can reinforce the argument by 
Owen-Smith et al. (2015) that the process of IPO withdrawal is affected by a network of strong, 
weak, positive and negative signals of the determinants defined in Table 3. As to whether the IPO 
withdrawal itself is a negative or a positive signal, this must be uncovered in further investigations. 
Second, imminent agency conflicts and the lack of appropriate control mechanisms can force a 
company to withdraw from the IPO. Third, the dominance of firm-level determinants on the 
probability of withdrawal indicates that the life cycle theory is of importance. As firms grow, a 
more dispersed ownership from insiders is required, which is closely interlinked with potential 
agency conflicts (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1999(. Finally, we shed light on the differences and 
similarities of determinants of IPO withdrawal under the lens of European equity market 
integration. We argue that a further alignment in EU legislation will harmonise the differences in 
the determinants of IPO withdrawal. 
Further evidence and research on the precise role played by VC and PE is required to 
surface the causal mechanisms. But what do the results presented here tell us? That the IPO 
process in a globalised world is too complex to be generalised by single country studies, and that 












Indeed, VC and PE involvement underlines the key question of the IPO withdrawal per se, as the 
IPO withdrawal themselves cannot be generalised. What happens with a company after it 
withdraws? Did the withdrawal lead to a better outcome for the company? Future research should 
focus on companies post-withdrawal and uncover new theories, such as that an IPO withdrawal 
backed by a VC or PE company might, after all, be a success dressed as a failure. 
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the public, each 
holding less 




capital for at 
least 12 
months 
compile or explain 
principle with the 
Corporate Governance 
Code of Denmark 




At least € 2.5 
million 
Minimum 25% 
free float (5% if 
less than €5 
million) 















None None German Corporate 
Governance Code, 




Italy At least three 
annual reports, 
latest one is 
subject to audit 
At least €40 
million 
Minimum 25 to 
35% free float; 
80% to 
institutional and 






Borsa Italiana S.p.A. 
Corporate Governance 
Code 
Norway At least three 
years of 
business 






capital for at 
compile or explain 
principle with the 












activity least 12 
months 
Practice for Corporate 
Governance 
Spain At least three 
annual reports 




None compile or explain 
principle with the 
Spanish Corporate 
Governance Code 
Sweden At least three 
annual reports 
At least €1 to 
€10 million 
Minimum 10 to 




at least 12 
months 
Recommendation of 





At least three 
annual reports 
must represent 








capital for at 
least 12 
months 
compile or explain 
principle with the UK 
Corporate Governance 
Code 
UK - AIM Financial 
accounts not 








None None Sufficient 
working 






Governance Code does 
not apply 
 
Table 2: Withdrawn and successful IPOs 2001 - 2015 
 Successful IPOs Withdrawn IPOs  
Year Absolute Percentage Absolute Percentage Total 
2001 192 83.48% 38 16.52% 230 
2002 112 84.21% 21 15.79% 133 












2004 261 91.90% 23 8.10% 284 
2005 366 91.73% 33 8.27% 399 
2006 360 89.11% 44 10.89% 404 
2007 283 91.00% 28 9.00% 311 
2008 88 82.24% 19 17.76% 107 
2009 16 88.89% 2 11.11% 18 
2010 112 81.16% 26 18.84% 138 
2011 99 77.95% 28 22.05% 127 
2012 58 85.29% 10 14.71% 68 
2013 95 89.62% 11 10.38% 106 
2014 175 87.94% 24 12.06% 199 
2015 176 88.00% 24 12.00% 200 
Total 2,474 88.11% 334 11.89% 2,808 
Note: The database includes 2,808 observations from 2001 to 2015. This table reports the absolute 
number and percentage of IPO filings for each year in Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, 
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
 
Table 3a: Data Description and Sources - Regulatory, Economic, and Market Environment 
Variable Variable Name Source Definition Predicted Effect 
Regulatory Environment  
1x  Rule of Law The Heritage 
Foundation 
Provides annual data on 
how the rule of law and its 
enforcement is 
experienced by the general 
public including 
dimensions such as 
property rights and 
freedom from corruption. 
Negative 




Provides annual data on 
how the regulatory 
efficiency is experienced 














measures such as labour, 
business and monetary 
freedom. 
3x  Market Openness The Heritage 
Foundation 
Provides annual data on 
how the openness of the 
markets is experienced by 
the general public 
including dimensions such 
as trade, investment and 
financial freedom. 
Negative 
4x  Common Law 
Dummy 
Prospectus This dummy variable 
takes the value of 1 if the 
IPO is in a common law 










The basis points of the 10 
year Government Bond 
yields are provided on a 
month end basis and 
approximate the cost of 
lending. 
Negative 
6x  Credit Spread Thomson 
Reuters 
Datastream 
The end of the month 
difference between the 10 
year Government Bond 
and the 1 year 
Government Bond yields 
signals the credit 
conditions. 
Positive 
7x  GDP – change 
of the Gross 
Domestic Product 
Bloomberg An aggregate measure of 
quarterly production equal 













values added of all 
resident, institutional units 
engaged in production. It 
provides information on 
the economic performance 
of a country. 
Market Environment 




Bloomberg This index represents a 
market estimate of the 
future volatility. Month 
end measures are 
considered. 
Positive 
9x   Index – change 






The monthly change of the 
corresponding main stock 
market index between the 
filling date and the prior 
month, providing 
information on the equity 
market (bull or bear 
market). 
Negative 
10x  Hotness Dummy Bloomberg The rolling averages of the 
number of filings 180 days 
prior to the specific IPO 
filing date are computed.* 
If the company faces a 
higher competition than 
average, the dummy 
variable takes a value of 1 
and 0 otherwise. This 
dummy is not 
complimentary to a 
coldness dummy. 
Negative 












Dummy trading volume 180 days 
prior to the specific IPO 
filing date are computed.* 
If the company files for an 
IPO during intensive 
trading, the dummy 
variable takes a value of 1 
and 0 otherwise. 




If the IPO company is 
mentioned in the same 
paragraph with specific 
negative terms given by 
the LexisNexis Negative 
News Search one year 
prior to the IPO or 
withdrawal, the dummy 
takes the value of 1 and 0 
otherwise.+ 
Positive 
*: Indicates that the variable has been constructed back to 6 months prior to the IPO filing date. 
+: Indicates that the variable has been constructed back to 12 months prior to the IPO withdrawal 
date. 
Please refer to the Online Appendix for more details. 
 
Table 3b: Data Description and Sources - Offer Characteristics 
Variable Variable Name Source Definition Predicted Effect 
Offer Characteristics 
13a
x  Offer Size Prospectus / 
Bloomberg 
The natural logarithm of the 








The 180 days rolling averages 
of the offer sizes prior to the 
IPO filling date are 













the value of 1 if the size of the 
offer is above average and 0 
otherwise. 
14x  Primary Shares Prospectus The percentage of newly 
created shares being sold in the 
IPO. 
Negative 
15x  Secondary 
Shares 
Prospectus The percentage of existing 
shares being sold in the IPO. 
Negative 
16x  Greenshoe 
Option 
Prospectus The percentage of extra shares 
that the underwriter is granted 
to sell additionally in the IPO 
depending on the demand. 
Negative 
17x  Debt Retirement 
Dummy 
Prospectus This dummy variable takes the 
value of 1 if the IPO company 
intends to retire debt with the 
IPO proceeds and 0 otherwise. 
Positive 
18x  Private Equity 
Dummy 
Prospectus This dummy variable takes a 
value of 1 if the company 
mentions private equity 
involvement in the prospectus 
and 0 otherwise. 
Positive 
19x  Venture Capital 
Dummy 
Prospectus This dummy variable takes a 
value of 1 if the company 
mentions venture capital 
involvement in the prospectus 
and 0 otherwise. 
Positive 
20x  Intellectual 
Capital Dummy 
Prospectus This dummy variable takes a 
value of 1 if the company 
discloses the intellectual 
capital or its competitive 
advantage in the prospectus 














21x  Underwriter Prospectus / 
Bloomberg 
The underwriter reputation is 
classified according to the 
European ranking of Vismara 
(2014) which ranges from 0 to 
the highest reputation of 1. In 
case of a consortium of 
underwriters, the average of 
the underwriter reputation is 
taken. 
Negative 
*: Indicates that the variable has been constructed back to 6 months prior to the IPO filing date. 
Please refer to the Online Appendix for more details. 
 
Table 3c: Data Description and Sources - Firm Characteristics 
Variable Variable Name Source Definition Predicted Effect 
Firm Characteristics  
22a
x  Firm Size Prospectus / 
Bloomberg 
The natural logarithm of the 








The rolling averages of the firm 
sizes measured by total assets 
are computed. This dummy 
takes the value of 1 if the size 
of the company is above 
average and 0 otherwise. 
Negative 
23a
x  Age Prospectus / 
Bloomberg 
The natural logarithm of the 
company’s age is computed. 
Negative 
23b
x  Age Dummy Prospectus / 
Bloomberg 
The rolling averages of the firm 
ages are computed. The 
dummy takes a value of 1 if the 
firm age is above average and 0 
otherwise. 
Negative 
24x  CapEx Prospectus / 
Bloomberg 
The position of capital 













total assets of the IPO company 
to get the CapEx ratio. 
25x  Return on Assets Prospectus / 
Bloomberg 
The position of net income is 
divided by the total assets of 
the IPO company to get the 
return on assets. 
Negative 
26x  Leverage Prospectus / 
Bloomberg 
The position of total debt is 
divided by the total assets to 
compute the level of leverage 
of the IPO company. 
Positive 





This dummy variable takes the 
value of 1 if the IPO company 
belongs to the high-tech 
industry and 0 otherwise. The 
categorisation of high-tech is 
based on the Eurostat definiton. 
Positive 
28x  Multinationality Prospectus The scale of Aggarwal et al. 
(2011) is taken to quantify the 
degree of multinationality 
which includes for instance the 
revenue created abroad or 
foreign assets. In case no 
country-level information can 
be gathered, the presence of 
subsidiaries are taken. The 
scale differentiates between 
seven categories of 
multinationality where the 
highest level of MNAT is the 
cumulation of all 
classifications up to the value 
of 1. 
Negative 













Table 3d: Data Description and Sources - Corporate Governance Characteristics 
Variable Variable Name Source Definition Predicted Effect 
Corporate Governance Characteristics  
29x  Retained 
Ownership 
Prospectus The proportion of ownership 
in shares hold by insiders 
post IPO (Djerbi and Anis, 
2015). 
Negative 
30x  Lock-up Prospectus Number of days the pre-IPO 
owners agree not to sell their 
shares. 
Negative 
31x  Board Size Prospectus This variable accounts for the 
absolute number of board 
members. 
Negative 
32x  Board 
Independence 
Prospectus This variable accounts for the 
ratio of board members that 
have no link to the IPO 
company. 
Negative 
33x  Female Board 
Members 
Prospectus This variable accounts for the 
ratio of female board 
members. 
Negative 
34x  CEO Duality 
Dummy 
Prospectus This dummy variable takes 
the value of 1 if the roles of a 
CEO and chairman are 
combined and 0 otherwise. 
Positive 
Please refer to the Online Appendix for more details. 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
 Successful IPOs Withdrawn IPOs  
Variable Mean SD Mean SD p-value successful 
vs. Withdrawn IPO 
Regulatory Environment  












2x  Regulatory 
Efficiency 
79.35 5.95 78.47 5.89 0.0109 
3x  Market Openness 78.92 8.46 78.55 7.62 0.4533 
4x  Common Law 0.53 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.0025 
Economic Environment 
5x  10yr Government 
Bond 
3.89 1.19 3.86 1.18 0.6443 
6x  Credit Spread 0.88 1.17 1.23 1.22 0.0000 
7x  GDP 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.0737 
Market Environment  
8x  VIX 17.04 5.55 18.66 6.28 0.0000 
9x   Index 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.0003 
10x  Market Hotness 0.63 0.48 0.58 0.49 0.0661 
11x  Trading Volume 24.80 21.30 20.50 18.70 0.0005 
12x  Negative News 0.07 0.25 0.31 0.46 0.0000 
Offer Characteristics  
13x  Offer Size (mn) 175 2,529 505 2,913 0.0281 
14x  Primary Shares 0.78 0.34 0.76 0.34 0.2100 
15x  Secondary Shares 0.22 0.34 0.24 0.34 0.2724 
16x  Greenshoe Option 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.0519 
17x  Debt Retirement 0.14 0.35 0.27 0.45 0.0000 
18x  Private Equity 0.16 0.37 0.24 0.43 0.0003 
19x  Venture Capital 0.06 0.23 0.10 0.30 0.0033 
20x  Intellectual 
Capital 
0.34 0.47 0.19 0.39 0.0000 
21x  Underwriter 0.24 0.26 0.25 0.27 0.7456 












22x  Firm Size (mn) 1,683 16,821 6,645 59,782 0.0011 
23x  Age (years) 16 26 22 34 0.0001 
24x  CapEx 0.20 4.43 0.13 1.28 0.7780 
25x  Return on Assets -0.07 6.48 0.55 13.81 0.1700 
26x  Debt 0.62 1.22 3.07 40.08 0.0025 
27x  High-Tech 0.24 0.43 0.21 0.41 0.2878 
28x  Multinationality 0.29 0.18 0.31 0.20 0.1832 
Corporate Governance Characteristics  
29x  Retained 
Ownership 
0.56 0.26 0.52 0.29 0.0033 
30x  Lock-up (days) 251 175 127 165 0.0000 
31x  Board Size 5.62 2.63 5.87 3.91 0.1160 
32x  Board 
Independence 
0.26 0.27 0.15 0.22 0.0000 
33x  Female Board 
Members 
0.09 0.14 0.09 0.15 0.5873 
34x  CEO Duality 0.15 0.36 0.14 0.35 0.6840 
Note: The database includes 2,474 observations of successful IPOs and 334 withdrawn IPOs. This 
table reports the means and standard deviations for 34 variables broken down by successful and 
withdrawn IPO filings. All variable definitions can be found in Table 1. 
 
Table 5: Determinants of IPO Withdrawal 
 Europe Continental Europe 
Levels Dummy Variable Levels Dummy Variable 






























1x  Rule of Law -0.009** -0.13 -0.010** -0.15 -0.009* -0.14 -0.009* -0.15 
2x  Regulatory 
Efficiency 
0.005** 0.07 0.004* 0.06 0.004 0.06 0.003 0.05 
3x  Market 
Openness 
0.014*** 0.20 0.016*** 0.24 0.015*** 0.24 0.017*** 0.27 








N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Economic Environment 
5x  10yr Gov. 
Bond 
0.001** 0.02 0.001* 0.01 0.003*** 0.05 0.003*** 0.05 
6x  Credit 
Spread 
0.001** 0.02 0.001** 0.02 0.001 0.01 0.001 0.01 
7x  GDP 0.006** 0.09 0.006** 0.09 0.006* 0.09 0.006* 0.10 
Market Environment 
8x  VIX 0.003*** 0.04 0.002*** 0.04 0.002 0.03 0.001 0.02 
9x   Index 0.001* 0.02 0.001 0.01 0.001 0.02 0.001 0.01 
10x  Market 
Hotness 
0.081 1.18 0.075 1.13 -0.028 -0.43 -0.038 -0.60 






-3.60 -0.241** -3.80 -0.235** -3.75 
12x  Negative 
News 
0.897*** 13.08 0.939*** 14.17 1.064*** 16.77 1.151*** 18.37 
Offer Characteristics 
13x  Offer Size 
(mn) 
0.002*** 0.03 0.375*** 5.66 0.002*** 0.03 0.396*** 6.32 
14x  Primary 
Shares 
-0.015 -0.21 -0.008 -0.12 -0.269 -4.24 -0.260 -4.14 
























17x  Debt 
Retirement 
0.237** 3.46 0.226** 3.41 0.318** 5.02 0.354*** 5.64 
18x  Private 
Equity 
0.264*** 3.85 0.259*** 3.90 0.217* 3.42 0.229* 3.65 
19x  Venture 
Capital 








-5.97 -0.285** -4.50 -0.277** -4.42 
21x  
Underwriter 
-0.001 -0.02 -0.001 -0.01 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.01 
Firm Characteristics 









23x  Age 
(years) 
0.002 0.03 -0.082 -1.24 0.002 0.03 -0.068 -1.08 
24x  CapEx -0.002 -0.02 -0.001 -0.01 0.004 0.07 0.004 0.06 
25x  Return on 
Assets 
0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 -0.001 -0.02 -0.001 -0.01 
26x  Debt 0.002** 0.03 0.003*** 0.04 0.000 0.01 0.001 0.01 




0.030 0.44 0.047 0.71 0.039 0.61 0.066* 1.05 
Corporate Gov. Characteristics 
























31x  Board Size -0.014 -0.21 0.007 0.10 -0.012 -0.19 0.015 0.24 











33x  Female 
Board 
Members 
-0.003 -0.04 -0.001 -0.01 -0.004 -0.06 -0.002 -0.03 











HL Statistic 16.592 (0.0347) 8.309 (0.4039) 3.722 (0.8813) 12.697 (0.1227) 
McFadden 2R  0.275 0.249 0.286 0.280 
Note: The dependent variable equals 1 for IPO withdrawal and 0 otherwise. *, ** and *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Marginal Effects are defined as follows: the probit 
employs normalisation that fixes the standard deviation of the error term to 1 where each 
coefficient represents the marginal effect of a unit change on the probability that the dependent 
variable takes the value of 1 (IPO withdrawal) given that all other independent variables are 
constant (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984). The McFadden R-squared is defined as 1 less the log 
likelihood for the estimated model divided by the log likelihood for a model with only an intercept 
as the independent variable. While the Hosmer-Lemeshow Statistic represents the goodness of fit 
that observed events match estimated events in ten subgroups of the model population, with the 
p-value reported in brackets. The database includes 2,808 observations. 
 
Table 6: Determinants of IPO Withdrawal - By Country 
 United 
Kingdom 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0.335 0.299 0.409 0.359 0.534 0.561 0.649 0.656 0.308 0.313 
Note: The dependent variable equals 1 for IPO withdrawal and 0 otherwise. *, ** and *** denote 












employs normalisation that fixes the standard deviation of the error term to 1 where each 
coefficient represents the marginal effect of a unit change on the probability that the dependent 
variable takes the value of 1 (IPO withdrawal) given that all other independent variables are 
constant (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984). The McFadden R-squared is defined as 1 less the log 
likelihood for the estimated model divided by the log likelihood for a model with only an intercept 
as the independent variable. While the Hosmer-Lemeshow Statistic represents the goodness of fit 
that observed events match estimated events in ten subgroups of the model population, with the 
p-value reported in brackets. The database includes 2,808 observations. 
 
Figure 1: A Taxonomy of Withdrawal Theories, Boeh and Dunbar (2013) 
 
Figure 2: Coverage of our Hand Collected IPO Data 
Figure 3: Percentage of listed vs. withdrawn IPOs 
 
Figure 4: Prinicpal Determinants of IPO Withdrawal 
 
Figure 5: Secondary Determinants of IPO Withdrawal 
 
Appendix - Data Description and Sources 
We provide an extension to Table 1 in order to describe the database creation process and to shed 
more light on the data and the sources. Given poor information quality for European IPO filings 
from 2001 to 2015, we construct our own database to assure data reliability which makes this study 
unique in its extent and depth of information on IPO filings and IPO withdrawal in Europe. We 
retrieve the list of IPO filings as well as the status of the listing from Bloomberg and validate the 
accuracy with the information provided by the respective stock exchanges. We categorise the 
status of the listing into successful which means that the IPO company listed, regardless if public 
trading develops; and withdrawn which entails that the IPO company did not issue shares despite 
its intent. In contrast to the USA, the event of an IPO withdrawal is not formerly defined or 
mentioned in EU or country-specific directives. This means the event of an IPO withdrawal cannot 












not older than two years. Henceforth, we can categorise a pending IPO filing as withdrawn after 
two years. In some cases, we can also infer the IPO withdrawal from the information provided by 
the stock exchanges, Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters or through news articles in the LexisNexis 
database. That is the primary reason why we cannot posit an exact IPO withdrawal date as any 
event window is rather blurry and inconsistent. IPO prospectuses are downloaded from 
Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters, stock exchange websites or through other internet sources. Based 
on these data, our data frame consists of a total of 2,808 companies that filed for an IPO between 
2001 and 2015, of which 2,474 were successful and listed whereas 334 (11.89%) withdrew. Our 
dataset covers 82% of the Western European IPO market. We arrange the variables in our dataset 
into six environments: Regulatory, Economic, Market, Offer, Firm, and Corporate Governance. 
We use monthly observations, due to data restriction in Europe. 
The Regulatory Environment includes yearly changing data on the country-specific Rule 
of Law, Regulatory Efficiency, and Open Markets. This information is provided by the Heritage 
Foundation14 and captures the overall regulatory environment in a given year and country. Rule of 
Law describes the perception by the general public of law enforcement (property rights, freedom 
from corruption etc.) in the given country. Regulatory Efficiency is an estimate of how this is 
experienced by the general public including dimensions such as labour, business, and monetary 
freedom. Market Openness describes how the openness of markets is perceived by the general 
public considering trade, investment, and financial freedom. The countries in our database 
experience yearly changes and differences. A Common Law dummy is also included where the 
value of 1 is assigned to countries in common law jurisdiction and 0 otherwise. 
The Economic Environment includes monthly variables such as the 10 year Government 
Bond, the Credit Spread, and the quarterly change of the Gross Domestic Product. Monthly basis 
points for country-specific 10 year Government Bonds approximate the cost of lending. We define 
the respective Credit Spread as the difference in basis points between the 10 year and the 1 year 
Government Bond yield in the month of the corresponding IPO filing. The change of the Gross 
Domestic Product is provided on a quarterly basis and is the aggregated measure of production 
equal to the sum of the gross values added of all residents and institutional units engaged in 
production. The two points in time for the GDP are quarterly changes between the quarter of the 
IPO filing date and the previous quarter. 













The Market Environment includes monthly variables such as the VIX. The Chicago 
Board Options Exchange SPX Volatility Index implies the market estimate of future volatility. 
Given that there is no equivalent index in Europe, we rely on the VIX arguing that equity markets 
are contagious. The monthly change of the main stock market index is a country-specific variable 
and reflects changes in equity prices of the country where the IPO is filed. In regard to the two 
points in time for the market index, we rely on monthly changes between the month of the IPO 
filing date and the previous month. The following market indices are used: for France the CAC 40 
Index, for Germany the DAX, for Italy the FTSE MIB, for Spain the IBEX 35 and for the UK the 
FTSE 100 is used. The monthly Hotness Dummy indicates the number of IPO filings in the 
specific country. The Trading Volume Dummy measures the monthly trading volume of the 
country-specific main stock market index. Both dummies are created as follows: the 
country-specific rolling averages of the number of filings (Hotness) or of the trading volume 180 
days prior to the month of the IPO filing are computed. If the IPO filing takes place in a month 
where there is a higher number of IPO filings than the 180 days average, the company faces higher 
competition and the Hotness Dummy takes the value of 1. This dummy is not complimentary to a 
coldness dummy. If the IPO filing is in a month with higher than average trading volume, the 
Trading Volume Dummy takes the value of 1. Finally, the Negative News Dummy takes the value 
of 1 if the IPO company is subject to negative news one year prior to the IPO filing month. Here we 
use of the LexisNexis database including main international and national newspapers, practitioner 
journals, and announcements. LexisNexis provides negative terms and we manually search for the 
appearance of the IPO company in connection with those negative terms in English as well as the 
country-specific language. We translate the negative search string code to the respective language 
for France, Germany, Italy and Spain. 15 
The Offer Characteristics are hand collected from the IPO prospectus. We account for the 
Offer Size with the logarithmised offer size value while also creating an Offer Size Dummy to 
mitigate possible inflation influences. The 180 days rolling average of the country-specific offer 
sizes is computed where the Offer Size Dummy takes the value of 1 if the firm specific offer size 
value is larger than the average. The offer structure is approximated with the percentage of newly 
                                                 














created shares for the IPO represented by Primary Shares, while the percentage of existing shares 
being sold in the IPO are measured by the Secondary Shares. The percentage of the extra shares to 
the total shares offered in the IPO is measured with the Greenshoe Option. The Debt Retirement 
Dummy accounts for the intention of the IPO company to use the IPO funds to deleverage, and 
takes the value of 1 if this is stated in the IPO prospectus or otherwise. The Intellectual Capital 
Disclosure Dummy accounts for supplemental information provided by the IPO company. It takes 
the value of 1 if the company discloses its competitive advantage, patents, licenses or any other 
form of intellectual capital in the IPO prospectus. The Private Equity likewise Venture Capital 
Dummy takes the value of 1 if the IPO company is backed by private equity or venture capital 
respectively during the IPO filing. The Underwriter variable measures the underwriters’ reputation 
in the European countries using the Vismara (2014) list which ranges from 0 to the highest 
reputation of 1. 
The Firm Characteristics are hand collected from the IPO prospectus. We account for the 
Firm Size with the logarithmised firm size value while also creating a Firm Size Dummy to 
mitigate possible inflation influences. The 180 days rolling average of the country-specific firm 
sizes is computed where the Firm Size Dummy takes the value of 1 if the specific firm size value is 
larger than the average. The Age is measured through the natural logarithm of the IPO company’s 
age since foundation. We also create an Age Dummy alike the other dummies. The 180 days 
rolling average of the country-specific age is computed where the Age Dummy takes the value of 1 
if the IPO company is older than the sample average. The Capital Expenditure is a ratio of the 
position of capital expenditure to the total assets of the IPO company. The Return on Assets is ratio 
of the IPO company’s net income to total assets. Debt is the ratio of total leverage to total assets. 
The High-Tech Dummy takes the value of 1 if the IPO company is categorised as high-tec  based 
on the Eurostat NACE code. Finally, the degree of Multinationality is measured by the scale of 
Aggarwal et al. (2011) which includes for instance foreign assets or the revenue created abroad. 
The scale differentiates between seven categories of multinationality where the highest level of all 
classification is 1. 
The Corporate Governance Characteristics are hand collected from the IPO prospectus 
and approximate the potential agency conflicts inherent in a public company post the IPO. We 
include Retained Ownership which is the proportion of ownership in shares hold by insiders post 












and accounts for the period that insiders agree to not dispose of any shares. The Board Size 
measures the total number of members on the board post the IPO. Board Independence is the ratio 
of defined independent board members that do not have a link to the IPO company. The variable 
Female Board Members measures the ratio of female board members post the IPO. The CEO 
Duality Dummy takes the value of 1 if both the roles of CEO and chairman reside with the CEO of 














 IPO withdrawal has been relatively understudied 
 We extend the limited research from the US to the European setting and much forward in 
time 
 We surface significant new evidence of the role of Venture Capital in a different 
institutional setting to heretofore 
 We also find new evidence on the role board structure 
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